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RECENT CASE NOTES
court as merely "a reasonable incentive for the prompt settlement, without
suit, of a class of just demands admitting of special legislative treatment." 27
Of course, it is not contended that the Indiana Garnishee Law came
within the reasonable classification requirements to which the above cases
give lip service, but it is submitted that our state Supreme Court has taken
a step away from the higher court's position of reluctance to disturb these
legislative divisions. Nor is the unyielding certainty of the court as to the
unreasonableness of so classifying debtors entirely invulnerable. Even assum-
ing the wage earners' need of protection since it is inherent in the modern
extensive use of credit that he will assume obligation beyond his means, yet
absolute prohibition of garnishment gives that protection at a disproportion-
ate cost to the creditor. 28 As Professor Brown points out,29 the debtor can
still enjoy 90% of his income free from any claims and the probabilities of
actual hardship because of such levy is extremely doubtful. In view of the
Indiana law invalidating assignments of future wages,30 the Garnishee Law
of 1925, although naturally unpopular, was, however, one of the least defective
solutions to the above creditor-debtor situation.3 ' However this may be
the next step in Indiana lies with the legislature.
H. A. A.
Constitutional Law-Validity of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.
Appellee prayed for a determination of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a written contract for the sale of shares of stock in a cor-
poration. Although the complaint alleged no invasion of appellee's rights,
the lower court acknowledged the prayer in a judgment rendered pursuant
to the Indiana enactment of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. The
judgment pronounced the rights and obligations which devolved upon the
parties from the construction which the court placed upon the disputed pro-
visions of the contract. This appeal challenges the constitutionality of the
statute. Held, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act does not offend the
Indiana constitution.'
Although a complete realization of the value of preventative justice is
an account in modern history, the declaratory judgment is not an adventure
in the judicial process. Here, as elsewhere in the evolution of human under-
standing, discovery is nothing more than a consciousness of the old. When
the first judgment was rendered in favor of a defendant a declaratory judg-
ment was given. There was no consequential relief demanding execution;
no one was summoned to conduct or reprimanded for conduct; it was merely
a declaration that a duty did not exist, or, if the duty and its correlative right
did exist, there had been no violation. More pronounced illustrations are
readily available in the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence. An action
to remove cloud from title, the giving of instructions to a trustee, the found-
ing of boundary lines, a suit to construe a will, quia timet-all carry the
impress of their modern sequel, the declaratory judgment.2 History, then,
is in accord with the recent decisions which have sustained preventative
justice.
27 Yazoo, etc., R. R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co. (1912), 226 U. S. 217; 19 Minn. L.
R. 119.
28 45 Harv. L. R. 1102.
29 2 Ind. L. J. 620, 624.
30 Burns' 1933, sec. 40-201.
31 Compare other legislative devices set out in 45 Harv. L. R. 1102.
1 Rauh v. Fletcher Savings & Trust Co. (1935), 194 N. E. 334 (Ind. Sup. Ct.).
2 Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace (1933), 288 U. S. 249; State ex rel.
Hopkins v. Grove (1922), 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82; Farabaugh and Arnold, The
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (1928), 3 Ind. L. J. 351.
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The contention is invariably raised, and was raised by appellant in this
case under Article 3, Section 1 of the Indiana constitution, that a declara-
tory judgment is in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Such
a challenge presupposes an usurpation of power by one branch of govern-
ment at the expense of another. The legislative department, whose power
is limited to the formulation of social control, has no claim to the applica-
tion of social control to specific cases. Neither the theoretical nor the prac-
tical limitations upon the executive branch embrace a power to determine
private controversy. It follows that the power to render declaratory judg-
rhents resides with the judiciary unless such a power is outside the govern-
mental purview. Despite the ostensible independence of the departments of
government, it is necessary that an agency of government apply the doc-
trine of separation of powers. A partial destruction of the doctrine is,
therefore, inherent to its enforcement. As guardian of the doctrine, the
judiciary is supreme. Unless prohibited by the construction which the
judiciary places upon the constitution, it is within the province of the judiciary
to ascertain whether government has the power to give declaratory judg-
ments and, if so, to allocate that power. The conclusion is that the judi-
ciary has transcended the doctrine of separation of powers so that, under a
realistic viewing, the courts may assimilate unto the judiciary that which
appears to them to be generic to the judicial character. Upon this principle
it is believed that the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act is not a grant
of power. It was within the exclusive ambit of judicial power to render
declaratory judgments without the polite surplusage of legislative enactment.3
As a logical incident to the functioning of a court under the broad, general
grant of power conferred by Article 7, Section 1 of the Indiana constitu-
tion, the declaratory judgment has always been at the discretion of Indiana
courts.
The function ot the judiciary is in the application of a formulated social
control to specific cases which results in a final determination, the judgment.
That is an adjudication. What, then, are the elemental requisites recognized
by the judiciary as indispensible to a judgment? An analysis of the deci-
sions reveals that these problems must be resolved before the word, judg-
ment, takes on definition. 1. It has been said that a judgment must carry
consequential relief. 2. There must be adverse parties which implies the
further requirement of an actual "case or controversy". 3. The proceed-
ings must accord with rules prescribed by law. 4. The court must have juris-
diction of the subject-matter. 5. The court must have made a reasonable
exercise of jurisdiction over the person. 6. The judgment must be res
judicata.
The following observations attempt to reveal, upon precedent and prin-
ciple, which, if not all, of the above matters are necessary to a judicial judg-
ment and, having determined the requisites, to ascertain whether those ele-
ments are included within the declaratory process.
We have already seen that consequential relief was not accorded in many
of the historical actions. After all, the right to damages, to execution, is a
remedial or secondary right. It is ancilliary to and meaningless without a
primary or antecedent right. The former is the protector; the latter the
protectorate. The right of freedom from bodily harm, the right of freedom
of locomotion, the whole bundle of rights protecting the social interests are
3 Gavit, Procedure Under The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (1933), 8 Ind.
L. J. 409. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay (1915), 2 K. B. 536, the court said, "I
can not doubt that had the Court of Chancery in those days (before 1852) thought it
expedient to make merely declaratory judgments they would have claimed and exercised
the right to do so".
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the reason for government, the values which the judicial organism compli-
ments, and in the glorification of which remedy is given. The law cannot
justify itself by permitting the destruction of a right only that the law may
offer a remedy. Prevention is preservation of the right. Through the
declaratory judgment the right becomes more nearly inviolate. To say that
the law is incapable of recognizing a right before the right is invaded is a
proposition which the hospitality of common sense cannot welcome. To
force a person into possible illegality merely because his complaint does not
include an assertion that some alleged right has been violated and his prayer
fails to ask damages is to forget that the remedy exists only to protect the
antecedent right. In the case of Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace,4
the United States Supreme Court dispelled dictum in Gordon v. United
States5 with a holding that consequential relief is not essential to a judgment.
There is a conclusive fund of opinion from the state decisions substantiating
a like proposition.6
The federal constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases
and controversies". If the word controversy is shorn of popular connotation
and given the technical dress which the decisions have fashioned, confusion
is resolved into the simple admission that any case before a court must
involve factual experience and a legal capacity of a party must be the subject
of litigation. The facts of any particular case necessarily determine whether
there is a controversy in the legal sense. Moot questions are not sanctioned
by the Declaratory Judgment Act. Dicta in the earlier federal cases,7 evi-
dently based upon a misconception of the holding in Muskrat v. United
States,8 warned that the declaratory judgment was not a "case or contro-
versy". Nevertheless, a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court
held that an issue decided in a state court pursuant to a declaratory judgment
statute is a "case and controversy" to which the jurisdiction of the federal
courts attaches.9 With a single and temporary interruption,' 0 the state
courts have unheld declaratory judgments either as a judgment resulting from
a controversy". or upon the theory that they are not bound by the "cases
and controversies" clause since that phrase does not appear in their constitu-
tions.12 With the decision of Zoercher v. Agler,13 the Indiana Supreme
Court had the decision turn upon whether there was a controversy. The Indi-
ana Appellate Court, in Owen v. Fletcher Savings and Trust Building Co.,' 4
formulated th6 decision upon a like issue. Yet the Indiana Supreme Court in
4 (1933) 288 U. S. 249.
5 (1865) 117 U. S. 697.
6 State ex rel. Hopkins v. Grove (1922), 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82; Blakeslee v.
Wilson (1923), 190 Calif. 479, 213 Pac. 495; Braman v. Babcock (1923), 98 Conn.
549, 120 A. 150; In re Kariher's Petition (1925), 284 Pa. 455, 131 At. 265.
7 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis (1927), 273 U. S. 70; Willing v. Chicago Audi-
torium Assn. (1928), 277 U. S. 274.
s (1911) 219 U. S. 346.
9 Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace (1933), 288 U. S. 249.10 Anway v. Grand Rapids R. R. Co. (1920), 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 305.
11Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore (1930), 249 Mich. 673; 229 N. W.
618; Miller v. Miller (1924), 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965; Braman v. Babcock (1923),
98 Conn. 549, 120 Atl. 150; In re Kariher's Petition- (1925), 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265;
McCrory Stores Corp. v. Braunstein, Inc. (1926), 102 N. J. L. 590, 134 Atl. 752; City
of Milwaukee v. Chicago and Northwestern Ry. (1930), 230 N. W. 626 (Wis.).
12 Grant Coal Mining Co. v. Coleman (1932), 204 Ind. 122, 179 N. E. 778; Sheldon
v. Powell (1930), 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258; Morton v. Pacific Construction Co. (1929),
283 Pac. 281 (Arizona); Patterson's Executors v. Patterson (1926), 144 Va. 113, 131
S. E. 217; State ex rel Hopkins v. Grove (1922), 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82; Blakeslee
v. Wilson (1923), 190 Calif. 479, 213 Pac. 495.
13 (1930) 202 Ind. 214, 172 N. E. 907.
14 (1934) 189 N. E. 173; (1934) 10 Ind. L. J. 99.
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Grant Coal Mining Co. v. Coleman 1 5 and in the decision under investigation
declared that the court was not bound by the Indiana constitution to proceed
only in "cases and controversies". The judicial pattern begun in Zoercher
v. Agler 1 6 has evidently been marred by judicial neglect.
The proceeding under the declaratory judgment act is in accord with law
in so far as the proceeding complies with the general rules of procedure ordi-
narily applicable. It is a difficult question whether the declaratory judgment
statute is itself adjective or substantive law. If the enactment confers a new
jurisdiction upon the courts, it necessarily falls within the scope of substan-
tive law, unless, as some opinion has it, neither the formal distinctions of
substance nor of procedure are applicable to describe jurisdictional problems.
This enactment does not extend the jurisdiction of the courts to new subject-
matter for the substantive rights of parties protected by the courts remain
untouched. Furthermore, as we have attempted to show, the courts had
jurisdiction to render declaratory judgments prior to the statute. The declara-
tory judgment is merely a judicial recognition of the legal capacities of
parties, that is, a declaration of rights, powers, privileges, and immunities.
Although decisions have intimated that a jurisdictional problem may be in-
volved, they have resolved the statute to be a matter of practice and pro-
cedure, a method of exercising jurisdiction.-7
There is no question of a jurisdiction of the person associated with the
rendition of declaratory judgments since that jurisdiction must have been
acquired and reasonably exercised as in any other type of determination.
It is submitted that if the elements above discussed and accepted as requi-
sites to a judgment. are present, the judgment is res judicata.18
J. F. T.
Parties-Real Party in Interest. The complaint in substance alleged that
the appellant was the owner of a certain truck, and while driving the same
upon the highway in the state of Indiana, the appellee, through its agent and
employee, carelessly and negligently drove its truck at a high rate of speed
and in consequence ran into the truck of appellant, thereby damaging it. The
appellee filed a general denial and also an affirmative answer to the complaint.
In the affirmative answer it was alleged that the appellee was not the proper
party in this suit because it had been paid in full for the damages by the
State Automobile Insurance Association and for this reason such Asso-
ciation had been subrogated to the rights of the appellee; and, therefore, it
and not the appellee was the real party in interest. On appellee's demurrer to
this answer being overruled, this appeal was taken. Held, that the demurrer
should have been sustained.'
It will be remembered that at common law the subrogee had no rights in
the law courts for he obtained subrogation only at the hands of equity. Sub-
rogation was strictly a creation of the equity courts. Hence, it necessarily
followed that the subrogor was the proper party in an action at law. An
assignment stood practically upon the same footing even though it was of a
legal nature rather than equitable. The assignee could not bring his action in
his own name, but was required to bring it in the name of his assignor. To
15 (1932) 204 Ind. 122, 179 N. E. 778.
16 (1930) 202 Ind. 214, 172 N. E. 907.
17 In re Kariher's Petition (1925), 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265; Sheldon v. Powell
(1930), 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258.
18 Borchard, The Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments (1931), 31 Colum.
L. R. 561.
1 Williamson v. Purity Bakeries of Indiana, Inc. (1935), (Ind. App.).
